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GUANTANAMO: LITIGATION

On Monday's Argument in Al-Bahlul
By Peter Margulies

Tuesday, October 1, 2013, 3:00 PM

Just as performers sometimes single out one member of the audience to reach, advocates in an en banc rehearing at a federal appeals court don’t
always expect to win over a majority. The government showed a couple of years ago in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd ( nding that the Attorney General had
quali ed immunity in a lawsuit by a material witness detained in a terrorism investigation) that persuading a judge or judges in an en banc
rehearing to write a well-crafted dissent can pave the way for a victory at the Supreme Court. Although discerning judges’ ultimate views based on
questions at an oral argument is an inherently risky undertaking, questions from Judge Janice Rogers Brown at Monday’s argument in al Bahlul v.
United States may hint at a reprise of the al-Kidd pattern. Judge Brown’s questions were an intriguing departure from the binary pattern of much of
the al Bahlul argument, analyzed with characteristic discernment by Wells and Raffaela. For much of the argument, al Bahlul’s lawyer Michel
Paradis relied on Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion in Hamdan II holding that material support (and by extension, inchoate conspiracy) are not
internationally accepted war crimes. DOJ’s Ian Heath Gershengorn parried with the government’s theory that a “US common law of war” can
supplement or even supplant international law. Judge Brown’s questions challenged this binary pattern, hinting at a path to upholding al Bahlul’s
conviction that would be consistent with international law. For example, Judge Brown asked whether the court could tie compliance with
international law to a “functional” approach that hinged on the underlying conduct of the defendant pleaded and proved by the government. Al
Bahlul, a propaganda aide to Osama bin Laden, acknowledged in a letter to senior Al Qaeda leader Ramzi bin al Shibh that he played a “role” in the
9/11 attacks by administering the bayat (Al Qaeda loyalty oath) to Mohammed Atta, the 9/11 plot’s ringleader in the United States, and Ziad al
Jarrah, the pilot on Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania.
The government’s problem here, as Paradis noted, is that al Bahlul was charged with inchoate conspiracy involving mere agreement, not with
conspiracy as a form of liability for a completed war crime such as the murder of civilians. As Lawfare readers know, Jim Schoettler and I submitted
an amicus brief for ex-military lawyers, national security of cials, and other experts in the eld (including Ben) arguing that the label attached to
the conduct mattered less than the conduct itself (see Steve’s comments, Kevin Jon Heller’s here, and my post in response). Our brief argued that
despite the government’s formal charging decision, the pleadings, proof, and ndings in the case were the functional equivalent of conspiracy as a
form of liability for the murder of civilians on 9/11. Bolstering this functional theory, the government’s charging documents cited al Bahlul’s
administration of the bayat as an overt act. Evidence against al Bahlul showed it was no mere coincidence that al Bahlul administered the bayat to
two integral members of the 9/11 conspiracy. Testimony from FBI agent Ali Soufan demonstrated that al Bahlul had acted as a mentor and guide for
Atta and al Jarrah, who lived with al Bahlul in Al Qaeda’s compound. In addition, the members of the military commission had speci cally found
that al Bahlul had administered the bayat. As our brief explained, the functional view is fair to the defendant, given the statements of al Bahlul at
trial acknowledging his letter to bin al Shibh, with its description of al Bahlul’s role in the 9/11 plot. Judge Brown seemed to view the functional tie
between the conspiracy charge and al Bahlul’s acknowledged role in the 9/11 attacks as providing a basis in international law for al Bahlul’s
conviction. Judge Brown’s questions also suggested an appreciation for the Framers’ intent in drafting the De ne and Punish Clause, which the
Supreme Court has repeatedly cited as an important source of the power to designate crimes triable in military commissions. The Framers, as my
recent article on al Bahlul and Hamdan II indicated, venerated international law. However, they also believed, as Madison noted in Federalist No. 42,
that customary international law had “inexact boundaries” (to quote Judge Brown). Madison urged granting Congress a measure of deference in
ascertaining where the border lies. In Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court cautioned against an unduly “meticulous” attempt by courts to x those
boundaries, when that attempt entailed second-guessing Congress. Justice Kennedy, in his Hamdan I concurrence, also stressed that Congress was
better suited than the courts to the “sensitive task” of determining what gloss on international law best suited the nation’s global commitments.
Indeed, DOJ’s Gershengorn had some of his best moments at the argument in making the case for deference to Congress, distinguishing that
posture from the judicial free-lancing that the Court recently rejected in Kiobel. It’s too early to tell whether Judge Brown’s questions foreshadow an
opinion delineating this approach. An opinion developing this analysis would be a salutary alternative to the binary pattern that drove much of
Monday’s arguments. It could echo the dissenting en banc opinion in al Kidd that garnered the Supreme Court’s attention. If that were true, the
government in al Bahlul could lose the battle, but win the war.
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